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In fluctuating environments, organisms require mechanisms enabling the rapid
expression of context-dependent behaviors. Here, we approach behavioral flexibility from
a perspective rooted in appraisal theory, aiming to provide a better understanding on
how animals adjust their internal state to environmental context. Appraisal has been
defined as a multi-component and interactive process between the individual and the
environment, in which the individual must evaluate the significance of a stimulus to
generate an adaptive response. Within this framework, we review and reframe the
existing evidence for the appraisal components in animal literature, in an attempt to reveal
the common ground of appraisal mechanisms between species. Furthermore, cognitive
biases may occur in the appraisal of ambiguous stimuli. These biases may be interpreted
either as states open to environmental modulation or as long-lasting phenotypic traits.
Finally, we discuss the implications of cognitive bias for stress research.
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Introduction
According to classic evolutionary theory, the modification of behavior by means of natural
selection is possible through its action on the genetic components of behavioral variation. Using
Mayr (1974) terminology, these genetic programs can be classified as closed or open, depending on
their permissiveness to modifications as they are translated into a behavioral program (phenotype).
The closed genetic programs represent genetically controlled fixed responses to environmental
cues (e.g., fixed action patterns), that have been selected due to the adaptive reliability of a specific
response to a stimulus. On the other hand, open programs, by allowing the integration of additional
inputs, are therefore subject to environmental modulation during the lifetime of the organism
(Mayr, 1974). Thus, behavioral flexibility, which can be seen as a particular case of phenotypic
plasticity, permits a rapid pathway for the adjustment to environmental changes that exceeds the
rate of evolutionary genetic change (Frank, 2011). Behavioral flexibility is characterized by variable
(within and between individuals), reversible, non-cyclic transformations in the individual’s
behavior, leaving open the possibility of further adjustments in the organism physiology and
morphology (Piersma and Drent, 2003; Taborsky and Oliveira, 2012).
Following previous work (Shettleworth, 2001; Oliveira, 2013), it is known that the range
of behavioral flexibility allowed by genetic programs is insufficient for a context-dependent
adjustment of behavior to highly variable and complex environments (e.g., social contexts),
therefore a greater degree of behavioral flexibility may be understood by accounting for
the cognitive abilities of the organism. Using appraisal theory (e.g., Moors et al., 2013),
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we hypothesize that the capacity of an organism to regulate its
internal state according to the evaluation of the conditions of
the outside world, rather than using simple stimulus-response
processes, is essential to the understanding of behavioral
flexibility and the adjustment of organisms to changing
environments. In this regard, we explore the study of cognitive
biases as resulting from the interference of affective states (Mendl
et al., 2009), genetic and environmental factors (Enkel et al.,
2010) on the evaluation of ambiguous stimuli, and how they
generate different behavioral phenotypes that diverge in their
resilience to stressful events.
The Concept of Appraisal
Appraisal can be defined as an inherently transactional process
between the individual and the environment, in which the
significance of the event must be detected and assessed
by the appraiser (Smith and Kirby, 2009; Moors et al.,
2013). Moreover, appraisal is not simply determined by the
objective characteristics of the stimuli or the individual’s
dispositional characteristics (Scherer, 2001). Instead it results
from an interaction, open to the individual’s motivational
and physiological state, in which the implications of the
stimulus circumstances as they relate to the individual’s
needs, resources and abilities are evaluated (Roseman and
Smith, 2001; Scherer, 2009; Smith and Kirby, 2009). A
key point in appraisal theory is to conceive appraisal not
as a single event triggered by environmental or internal
changes, but as a dynamic recursive process of appraisal
followed by reappraisal, reflecting the constant inflow of
information characteristic of changing environments, that
must be monitored to correct previous evaluations and
generate flexible responses (Scherer, 2001, 2009). Starting
from Arnold’s theory (Arnold, 1960) up to the current
models (reviewed in Moors et al., 2013), appraisal has
been encompassing both automatic and deliberate processes.
Therefore, although Lazarus’s work (Lazarus, 1991) refers
to appraisal as ‘‘cognitive appraisal’’ given the focus on
more controlled processes—this nomenclature should not be
interpreted as a denial of the involvement of automatic
processes in appraisal (Lazarus, 2001). Accordingly, based on
an innovative proposal by Leventhal and Scherer (1987) for
appraisal processing in humans, we review its existence in non-
human animals through the description and operationalization
of the relevant appraisal components performed at different
levels of processing (an updated model can be found in Scherer,
2009).
Appraisal in Animals
Appraisal components (see Table 1, for examples in animal
studies) allow the evaluation of an event, by combining
both the individual’s affective state and the momentary
environmental conditions as contributing factors to the
appraisal process (Scherer, 2001; Ellsworth and Scherer,
2003). In this mini-review, we discuss evidence from animal
research for specific appraisal components, namely novelty,
predictability, pleasantness and coping. Other appraisal
components described in humans, like internal (Schomerus
et al., 2012) and external standards (Moscovitch and Hofmann,
2007) will not be considered, since these components refer
to the influences of self and social-norms in the appraisal
process and thus may not be present in non-human
animals.
A set of appraisal components (novelty, predictability and
pleasantness) rely on the organism’s ability to determine if
the stimulus is significant enough to elicit further processing
(i.e., stimulus relevance, Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). When
an individual is confronted with a novel event (novelty
component), its response will be determined by stimulus
suddenness and salience (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). In
zebrafish, for example, changes in exploratory behavior in
response to a novel tank have been described, such that fish
responded with an increase in exploratory swimming and
a decrease in freezing within the first minutes of the test
(Wong et al., 2010). Moreover, over the course of 7 days
of daily exposures to the same tank, fish habituated to the
tank, that is they spent more time in exploration and less
time in freezing, a reflection of acquired familiarity with
the stimulus. Besides familiarity, an animal is also able to
detect regularities in the environment (e.g., association between
stimuli), in order to estimate the probability of a certain event
occurring—predictability component (Ellsworth and Scherer,
2003). The anticipation of rewarding and aversive stimuli allows
animals the ability to predict events reducing the uncertainty in
their environment, therefore increasing welfare (Spruijt et al.,
2001). Predictable negative events tend to be less stressful (Weiss,
1970; Galhardo et al., 2011; Piato et al., 2011), since there is
a signaling event that enables the organism to anticipate the
aversive stimulus. For example, studies in sheep show that by
predicting an event (drop of a white and blue panel behind
the food container) in an associative scheme with a light cue,
lambs showed less startle responses than their counterparts in
an unpredictable treatment (Greiveldinger et al., 2007). Some
studies suggest that it is not the anticipation of the negative
stimulus, but the absence of the signal that predicts the aversive
event that makes predictable aversive events less stressful,
since cue absence indicates a safety period (Seligman, 1968;
Bassett and Buchanan-Smith, 2007). Fowls trained in classical
conditioning (conditioned stimulus—CS: music; unconditioned
stimulus—US: food), showed comfort behaviors, such as peening
and wing flapping, in anticipation of food (Zimmerman et al.,
2011). Moreover, rats trained in a Pavlovian conditioning
paradigm, through the association of a tone (CS) with a food
reward (US), showed an increase in behavioral transitions
(hyperactive) during the 3 min interval between CS and US,
as a result of anticipation of food (van den Bos et al., 2003).
Furthermore, the same study suggests that the conditioned
response in cats is different from the one observed in rats
in anticipation to the rewarding stimulus (van den Bos et al.,
2003). Similarly, studies in halibut showed that delay and trace
conditioning elicited different conditioned responses, depending
on the temporal presentation of CS and US (Nilsson et al.,
2010). Intrinsic pleasantness component determines the valence
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TABLE 1 | Relevant examples of appraisal components in animals.
Appraisal goal Appraisal component Function Animal Reference
Relevance Novelty Orienting, Fowl Dawkins (2002)
Focusing, Lamb Désiré et al. (2002)
Alerting Zebrafish Wong et al. (2010)
Predictability Alerting, Rat van den Bos et al. (2003)
Readiness, Rat Weiss (1970)
Anticipation Cichlid fish Galhardo et al. (2011)
Zebrafish Piato et al. (2011)
Lamb Greiveldinger et al. (2007)
Fowl Zimmerman et al. (2011)
Pleasantness Approach, Zebrafish Xu et al. (2007)
Withdrawal Zebrafish Al-Imari and Gerlai (2008)
Sea bream Millot et al. (2014)
Implication and Coping Coping Control, Rat Weiss (1968)
Adjustment Rat Overmier et al. (1980)
Lamb Greiveldinger et al. (2009)
(positive or negative) of the event (Ellsworth and Scherer,
2003). Organisms’ approach/withdrawal responses have been
used to assess pleasantness of events (Xu et al., 2007; Al-
Imari and Gerlai, 2008; Millot et al., 2014), with approach
and withdrawal referring, respectively, to positive/pleasant and
aversive/unpleasant. In an associative learning study, zebrafish
learned to swim from a light compartment (CS) to a darker
compartment to avoid an electric shock, a withdrawal response
that indicates unpleasantness towards the aversive event (Xu
et al., 2007). Furthermore, the same species was also able to
associate a visual cue (red card) with a rewarding stimulus (sight
of a shoal), so that when tested in the presence of the red
card itself, fish spent more time in the proximity of the visual
cue than animals in the unpaired group, where no association
between the red card and the shoal was established (Al-Imari
and Gerlai, 2008). The proximity of zebrafish to the visual cue
associated to the shoal demonstrates the pleasantness associated
with conspecifics presence and suggests the shoal as a rewarding
stimulus.
Other appraisal components determine to what extent
an animal can evaluate the implications of a situation and
control or adapt to it—coping component (Scherer, 2001;
Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003). One can cope with a stimulus
by controlling it (controllability) or, in cases when control is
not possible, by adjusting to it (adjustment) (Scherer, 2001). A
pioneer study conducted in rats showed that animals choose
preferentially an operant-obtained food reward instead of a
free reward, indicating that control itself can be rewarding
(Overmier et al., 1980). This phenomenon is also described
in the literature as contrafreeloading (reviewed in Inglis et al.,
1997). Additionally, controlling an event can be perceived as
less stressful, as demonstrated by Greiveldinger et al. (2009)
where lambs that controlled (learning an operant task) an
aversive event that would prevent access to food, were more
willing to enter the test arena and eat there. Conversely,
when exerting control is not possible, animals can cope by
adapting to the situation (Désiré et al., 2002). For instance,
a study showed that rats which performed a coping response
to escape or avoid an electrical shock, by jumping up onto a
platform when the aversive stimulus was delivered, developed
less physiological symptoms (weight loss and gastric lesions) of
stress than the group where coping was not possible (Weiss,
1968).
Appraisal components mentioned above operate at different
levels of processing (Leventhal and Scherer, 1987), namely:
(1) sensorimotor—that includes automatic processes and implies
innate sensory-motor programs; (2) schematic—an automatic
mechanism that involves schemata matching processes, which
integrates sensory-motor and cues (e.g., visual) signaling specific
affective situations; and (3) conceptual—complex processing that
requires the evaluation of stimulus implications and translates
into a problem solving ability that promotes the adjustment to
the new situation. If the stimulus is novel (novelty), its processing
requires innate sensorimotor mechanisms, since there is no
information previously stored that needs to be integrated in
the response (Désiré et al., 2002). On the contrary, if the event
is familiar, predictable or pleasant, the animal has to combine
past knowledge of the situation with current information, in
a schematic level of processing (Désiré et al., 2002). Finally,
the coping component, which is based on the assessment of
stimulus implications, allows the animal to control or adapt to
the event, involving a problem-solving ability, characteristic of
the conceptual level of processing (Désiré et al., 2002).
Although animal research suggests the existence of appraisal
components in animals (Wong et al., 2010; Galhardo et al.,
2011; Piato et al., 2011), studies verifying the contribution of
several components to the evaluation of the same stimulus are
still missing in non-human animals. Several experiments by
Greiveldinger and colleagues (Greiveldinger et al., 2007, 2009,
2011) suggest the presence of multicomponent appraisal in
lambs by validating several appraisal components: suddenness,
predictability, controllability and discrepancy from expectations.
By using the same stimulus (feeding event), Greiveldinger and
co-workers saw that lambs were able to predict food delivery
(Greiveldinger et al., 2007), to control an aversive event in order
to have access to food (Greiveldinger et al., 2009), to memorize
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the amount of food given and form expectations about the load
of food that was going to be supplied (Greiveldinger et al.,
2011). Taken together, these studies seem to indicate a distinct
contribution of different appraisal components, operating at
different levels of processing (Scherer, 2001), to the evaluation
of the same event. While predictability (Greiveldinger et al.,
2007) is an appraisal component operating on the schematic
level of processing, controllability (Greiveldinger et al., 2009) and
discrepancy from expectations (Greiveldinger et al., 2011) may
imply problem solving abilities, hence providing an example of a
more elaborate processing of environmental information in non-
human animals.
It seems reasonable to state that approaches like the one
Greiveldinger and colleagues followed, should be used when it
comes to attest the presence of appraisal in animals. Moreover,
appraisal research in non-human animals should pursue
approaches that evaluate the presence of different appraisal
components to the same event, acting at the sensorimotor,
schematic and conceptual levels, leaving behind the tendency
to concentrate on simpler components to postulate appraisal in
animals.
Cognitive Bias and Behavioral Flexibility:
Implications for Stress Research
Since appraisal allows animals to evaluate stimuli, not only by
relying on their intrinsic characteristics but also considering the
subject’s internal state (Scherer, 2009), affect-induced alterations
of inner state, brought by changes in the environment, can lead
to a variety of internal states accountable for biased evaluations
of ambiguous events—also known as cognitive biases (Paul et al.,
2005; Mendl et al., 2009). Moreover, if appraisal depends on the
interaction between stimulus characteristics and internal state, an
animal in a negative or positive affective state will tend to evaluate
an ambiguous stimulus as more negative or positive, respectively
(Mendl et al., 2009).
Several studies have been addressing cognitive biases in
animals and how specific affective manipulations influence these
processes (Harding et al., 2004; Mendl et al., 2010; Bateson
et al., 2011; Rygula et al., 2013). A great part of the literature
so far, focused on inducing a negative state by using stressful
manipulations (e.g., unpredictable housing, Harding et al., 2004;
shaking, Bateson et al., 2011; chronic stress, Rygula et al., 2013).
In a seminal paper, Harding and co-workers (Harding et al.,
2004) have shown that rats exposed to unpredictable housing
conditions exhibited pessimistic evaluations of ambiguous
stimuli. In that study, rats were trained to associate a positive tone
with a food reward and a negative tone with an aversive white
noise, after which they were exposed to an unpredictable housing
period. Afterwards, when confronted with non-reinforced tones
(ambiguous stimuli), individuals were slower to respond and
tended to show fewer responses to ambiguous tones close to
the positive tone and to this tone itself, an outcome consistent
with a negative state (Harding et al., 2004). More recently,
Mendl et al. (2010) showed that dogs that presented more
vocalizations and destructive behaviors when left home alone
(separation-related behavior) also exhibited a pessimistic bias.
These dogs were trained to associate a positive location with
food and a negative location with the absence of food (Mendl
et al., 2010). When tested for locations in between positive
and negative ones (ambiguous locations), dogs with a higher
score of separation-related behavior ran slower than the ones
with lower scores, confirming that dogs in a more negative
state make more negative judgments about ambiguous stimuli
(Mendl et al., 2010). Cognitive bias has also been documented
in bees (Bateson et al., 2011). Bees were trained to extend their
proboscis in response to an odor mixture predictive of a reward
(sucrose) (CS+) and to withhold their mouthparts in response
to an odor mixture predicting a punishment or a less valuable
reward (CS−; Bateson et al., 2011). When tested for novel
(ambiguous) odor combinations, shaken bees were more likely
to withhold their proboscis to the most similar odor to CS−,
conveying evidence for pessimistic bias (Bateson et al., 2011).
Finally, a recent study showed that rats displaying the pessimistic
trait were more willing to develop stress-induced anhedonia
compared to their optimistic counterparts (Rygula et al., 2013).
Furthermore, both optimistic and pessimistic animals after being
exposed to chronic stress, were more biased to make pessimistic
judgments about ambiguous stimuli (Rygula et al., 2013). Rats
learned to press a lever to get access to a reward (sucrose) after a
positive tone was displayed and learned to press a lever to avoid
an electric shock when a negative tone was presented (Rygula
et al., 2013). After training, rats were tested with an intermediate
tone to screen them for cognitive bias, and pessimistic animals
were more prone to press the negative cued lever, whereas the
optimistic individuals were more willing to press the positive
cued lever (Rygula et al., 2013). Interestingly, rats belonging to
the control group showed pessimistic and optimist judgments
over time, which shows that cognitive bias, as in humans, reunites
characteristics both of a trait and of a transient state (Kluemper
et al., 2009; Rygula et al., 2013).
Based on these findings, we suggest that cognitive bias can
be conceptualized as a plastic trait (i.e., a behavioral trait that
is susceptible to environmental variation, Dingemanse et al.,
2010). Thus, cognitive bias in animals can be interpreted as
an open program, since it enables the integration of additional
inputs and is subject to environmental modulation over time
(Mayr, 1974). Moreover, since animals are exposed to rapid
and constant changes in the environmental conditions, cognitive
bias can be used as an adjustment to a new context and
considered a case of behavioral flexibility. It has been suggested
that behavioral flexibility is characterized by within and between-
subjects variability mechanisms (Piersma and Drent, 2003;
Taborsky andOliveira, 2012) and both of thesemechanisms seem
to be present in the case of cognitive bias. As a state, it may
change depending on the situation or contextual factors (within-
subjects variability). Once individuals exhibit a phenotype (e.g.,
optimistic/pessimistic) consistent over time (trait), it may act as
a mechanism of between-subjects variability (see Figure 1, for a
model linking appraisal and behavioral flexibility in animals).
By being open to environmental modulation, optimistic
and pessimistic phenotypes may differ in the resilience they
confer to the individual in stressful situations. Assessing the
stress resilience of optimistic and pessimistic phenotypes seems
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FIGURE 1 | Appraisal as the basis of behavioral flexibility. (A) Animals
evaluate environmental changes using an appraisal process that comprises a
set of stimulus evaluation checks (here represented by appraisal components).
(B) Once changes in the environment induce alterations in affective states of
animals, cognitive bias arises in contexts of stimulus ambiguity. (C) Cognitive
bias may be seen either as a state or a trait. As a state it may change
depending on the situation or contextual factors—within-individual variability;
and as a trait it is consistent over time with different individuals exhibiting a
specific phenotype—between-individual variability (e.g., optimistic/pessimistic).
(D) Both mechanisms are characteristic of behavioral flexibility. (E) These
behavioral flexibility processes promote an adaptive response to new
environmental changes that may occur. (F) Conversely, the appraisal process
may be subject to a long-lasting modulation by cognitive bias as a trait, and
short-term effects (G) are expected when cognitive bias occurs as a state.
especially relevant for the study of stress related disorders (SRD;
Kalisch et al., 2014). In fact, patients suffering from SRD often
evaluate ambiguous cues as negative, hence frequently leading to
negative states (Kalisch et al., 2014). Data in human studies show
that individuals with severe depression, whenmaking predictions
about their future, tend to expect things to be worse than they
turn out to be—pessimistic bias (Strunk et al., 2006). In rodents,
studies have emphasized the influence of depressive-like states
(Enkel et al., 2010) in cognitive biases by showing that both
congeniality helpless rats (a genetic model of depression) and
rats in a noradrenergic-glucocorticoid challenge (stress-related
changes in endogenous neuromodulation) showed pessimistic
bias towards ambiguous stimuli. Moreover, Rygula et al. (2013)
demonstrated that anhedonia occurs faster and lasts longer in
pessimistic rats, confirming that both traits are different in
their vulnerability to stress-induced depressive symptoms. We
argue that some biases (optimistic) may be more stress resilient
and that cognitive bias may be an effective way of assessing
resilience and its neural mechanisms in animals. By focusing
on cognitive bias paradigms it would be possible to assess how
negative or positive states/traits influence one’s evaluation of
ambiguous stimuli andwhich individuals aremore stress resilient
(i.e., individuals in negative states are less resilient to aversive
events) (Rygula et al., 2013). Furthermore, screening animals for
pessimistic and optimistic phenotypes may be helpful in the field
of antidepressant drugs research, since pessimistic and optimistic
animals may diverge in their response to these antidepressants
(Rygula et al., 2013).
Concluding Remarks
The evidence reviewed in this article supports the hypothesis that
appraisal is a key mechanism for behavioral flexibility, allowing
the adjustment of the organism to complex and changing
environments. In this regard, the study of cognitive bias has
shown how affect manipulations induce alterations in judgment
biases, with a large body of work suggesting that negative
affect manipulations lead to negative states (pessimistic). Based
on the research reviewed, we also suggest that cognitive
bias could be interpreted as a trait open to environmental
modulation (Dingemanse et al., 2010), that confers alternative
strategies for dealing with stressful situations (Rygula et al.,
2013).
Although we can identify an emerging literature in
appraisal processes in animals, most research has focused
on stimulus relevance (novelty, predictability, pleasantness).
Studies focusing on other components are required for a
better understanding of the mechanisms involved in the
appraisal process and the proximate causes of behavior.
Furthermore, research approaches that evaluate the presence
of different appraisal components (acting at the different
levels of processing) should be considered, since one
can only demonstrate appraisal by proving the existence
of components that use simple and complex levels of
processing.
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